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Every day, food producers and processors provide products consumed by 250 million people in this country. Each of 
those consumers is affected by the content of their foods. With advances in food production, processing, and distribu-
tion technology, the role of food labels has become increasingly important. Current research and views related to food 
labeling issues were discussed at a conference held in Washington, D.C. on March 20-21, 2003. This article gives an 
overview of food-labeling issues and summarizes the research findings presented at the conference. Issues discussed in 
this paper include the impact of food labels on consumer purchase decisions, the role of the private versus the public 
sector in providing credibility to marketing claims, the costs and benefits of voluntary and mandatory labels, and the 
implications of country-of-origin labeling. 
tices”), to state health claims (“may prevent can-
cer” or “promotes cardiovascular health”), and/or 
to give warnings about the product (“may upset the 
stomach”). Nevertheless, food labels are all about 
quality (Clayton 2003).
Current research and views related to food-
labeling issues were discussed at a conference 
held in Washington, D.C. on March 20–21, 2003. 
The conference featured speakers from industry, 
government, consumer-advocate groups, and 
academia, and provided a forum for discussing the 
issues surrounding food labels, such as country-of-
origin labeling guidelines, intra- and inter-country 
economic impacts of food-labeling requirements, 
and industry-regulator relations. This article gives 
an overview of food-labeling issues and summarizes 
the research findings presented at the conference.
The Use of Labels to Gain Price Premiums 
In general, firms have used voluntary labeling as a 
form of advertising to increase consumers’ knowl-
edge of certain attributes of their products. Just 
like any form of advertising, labeling is intended 
to increase the demand for the firm’s product and to 
differentiate its product from those of competitors. 
This may in turn create potential for price premi-
ums. The rather significant amount of producing 
firms’ resources that is spent on advertising signals 
the market incentives for constructing successful 
label messages. In 1997, U.S. producers spent over 
12 percent of domestic food expenditure on packag-
ing and advertising, including labeling costs (Golan, 
Kuchler, and Mitchell  2000). But how effective has 
the use of labels been in increasing consumer de-
mand and creating a market environment conducive 
to price premiums? 
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Every day, food producers and processors pro-
vide products consumed by 250 million people in 
this country. Each of those consumers is affected by 
the content of their foods. With the improvement of 
living standards, consumers have become increas-
ingly concerned about health and general well-be-
ing. Today’s consumers demand more information 
than ever about the attributes of their foods such 
as quality, nutrition content, production process, 
safety, and the origin of their foods (Henneberry 
2003). On the supply side, a wide variety of foods 
carrying highly sophisticated qualitative attributes 
are available in the market. Scientific advances 
continue to increase consumers’ knowledge about 
the various aspects of contemporary foods. Some 
of these aspects are related to quantifiable chemi-
cal characteristics such as nutritional composition, 
while others are related to qualitative characteristics 
that are not easily measured, such as health claims 
for prevention of diseases or improved fitness. 
Among other objectives, labels on foods have 
been used to satisfy consumers’ increased demand 
for information and to help buyers make wise food 
choices. 
With advances in food production, processing, 
and distribution technology, the role of food labels 
has become increasingly important. Both volun-
tary and mandatory labeling has been used in the 
U.S. and other regions of the world to disseminate 
information about the foods we consume. Labels 
are used to give information on nutritional content 
(“a good source of vitamin C”), country of origin, 
production process (“free of genetically modified 
ingredients” or “produced under fair labor prac-Henneberry and Armbruster Emerging Roles for Food Labels   63
McCluskey and Loureino (2003) show that con-
sumers will pay a small premium for eco-labeled 
apples. However, their study concludes that it is dif-
ficult to garner a premium for apples based on “envi-
ronmentally sound” practices. Compared to organic 
apples, eco-labeled apples may be a less-desirable 
choice for certain consumers who may perceive the 
organic apples to be safer and more environmental 
friendly. Roheim and Donath (2003) find that eco-
labeled fresh seafood is favored over non-labeled 
fresh seafood, even where there is a price premium. 
However, their study also addresses the issue of 
whether consumers would switch from one species 
of fish that is not eco-labeled to another species that 
is eco-labeled. Their conclusion is that consumers 
will not switch just because of the label. 
Labels to Guide Confused Consumers
Society’s increased demands for safer, healthier, 
and more traceable foods stems from the increased 
ability to identify food characteristics and to detect 
foodborne illnesses. Public awareness of foodborne 
diseases, nutrition, and environment has led to an 
increase in demand for safer foods that involve 
an environmentally friendly production process. 
However, consumers’ purchasing behavior does 
not always reflect their stated preferences. For ex-
ample, people are uncomfortable about the produc-
tion processes that use growth hormones and food 
irradiation, although these processes can produce 
safer foods (Shogren et al. 2002). Another example 
is the growing concern about chemical residues in 
or on foods. In spite of the concerns about chemical 
residues, many consumers are not willing to pay the 
premium for organic foods. However, some find 
the not-so-perfect appearance of organic foods 
appealing. 
When it comes to biotechnology, surveys have 
shown that although consumers may state that they 
actively avoid biotech foods when asked through 
surveys, they act differently in the store by buying 
foods that are clearly labeled as biotech (McHughen 
2003; Noussair, Robin, and Riffieux 2002). There 
is also no clear consensus toward biotech foods 
among consumers living in various parts of the 
world. While 53 percent of European consumers 
reject genetically modified foods as too risky and 
morally unacceptable, 64 percent of US consumers 
are either supportive of or neutral toward GM foods 
(Marks, Kalaitzandonakes, and Zakharova 2002). 
Even in the case of solid, factual information such 
as that listed on the nutrition panel, consumers’ pur-
chases do not always reflect rational choices. Cir-
cumstances such as hunger, a hectic schedule, and 
where we choose to obtain our food can overcome 
good intentions (Mancino and Kinsey 2002). 
Labels may help confused consumers make 
choices that better reflect their preferences (cor-
rectly asserting their preferences). In the case of 
government intervention in labeling, one goal is to 
influence individual consumption choices to align 
them with social objectives (Golan, Kuchler, and 
Mitchell 2000). An understanding of the true costs 
and benefits of labeling is important when evaluat-
ing the net benefits of food labels to individuals 
and to society. The obvious benefit to the private 
firm of labeling can be measured in terms of price 
premiums and increased sales, while the observable 
costs involve those associated with labeling includ-
ing the cost of chemical analysis, printing of labels, 
the verification associated with what is stated on the 
label, and the cost of third-party services to bolster 
the credibility of voluntary labeling. There are also 
costs associated with revealing more information 
to consumers that takes place when producers of 
different brands or different foods draw attention to 
the undesirable characteristics of the product.
Through better consumer protection and provi-
sion of information, labels may increase consumer 
welfare by helping them make informed choices 
(Verbeke and Ward 2003). However, research on 
whether labeling has been an effective policy tool 
in educating consumers and changing consumption 
behavior has been mixed. In other words, better be-
havior does not necessarily follow better and more 
information. Take the example of labels making 
nutrition and health claims. With the exception of 
poultry and meat labels, which are regulated by 
USDA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
primarily governs health claims while advertising 
claims are primarily under the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The NLEA (Nu-
trition, Labeling and Education Act of 1990) made 
significant changes to the voluntary system of label-
ing originally established in 1973 by FDA. NLEA 
required mandatory nutrition labeling for almost all 
packaged food and set strict regulations for health 
claims. However, this policy has been costly to the 
producers and eventually to consumers in terms of 
higher food prices. The FDA estimated that over the 
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$163 million and the food industry $1.4 billion to 
$2.3 billion (Nayga 2003). More recently, the FDA 
has proposed changing key features of the labeling 
policy following several adverse First Amendment 
rulings from the courts (Ippolito 2003). The courts 
have discussed means to communicate scientific 
evidence to consumers in a way that would not mis-
lead them, even if the science were still uncertain 
(Williams 2003). 
The effectiveness of policy on food advertising 
and the subsequent impact on the quality of diet is 
an interesting question. The study by Ippolito docu-
ments the strong relationship between policy and 
the amount of food-advertising health claims. For 
example, in the late 1980s when the policy on food 
labeling was relaxed, the use of health claims rose 
sharply. However, when the rules were tightened 
in 1990, the use of health claims fell significantly. 
To assess the relationship between the regulatory 
events and the use of health claims, Ippolito uses 
various simple regressions that relate to time and 
to the key regulatory events the likelihood that an 
advertiser uses a claim. The study shows that there 
is no evidence of increased advertising in “good” 
food categories in the post-NLEA period, but 
some evidence of reduced advertising in certain 
food categories. Furthermore, the study finds that 
the reductions are significant in the “fats & oils” 
category targeted for reduced consumption, as well 
as in “fruits & vegetables” targeted for increased 
consumption. Nevertheless, since NLEA the two 
categories with significant net increases in the use 
of health claims include “fruits & vegetables” and 
“low-fat dairy products,” which were targeted for 
increased consumption. In summary, in the post-
NLEA period the number of “fruit & vegetable” 
advertisements fell sharply, but those producers 
who continued to advertise were more likely to 
use health claims. 
In the last few decades many people in both the 
public and private sector have become more and 
more concerned about the increase in obesity and 
diabetes. One question is whether foods labels are as 
helpful as they can be in helping people select prod-
ucts that control weight gain (Williams 2003). In 
evaluating the effectiveness of food-labeling policy, 
Nayga (2003) shows that nutrition labels provide 
measurable benefits by improving diet quality as 
measured by the Healthy Eating Index (HEI). The 
endogenous switching regression technique was 
employed in the study to control for self-selectivity 
in the label-use decision and diet intakes. Moreover, 
the results of the study indicate that income and age 
are positively related to diet quality regardless of 
label use, and that people with at least some college 
education have a higher HEI than people with no 
college education. Interestingly, results show that 
employed label users have lower HEIs than do un-
employed label users. Perhaps their having less time 
to spend on food leads to this finding.
On the international side, Ward and Verbeke 
(2003) investigated the information cues on meat 
labels in Europe that attract consumer interest. More 
specifically, they look at demographic profiles to see 
how consumers vary in terms of which cues they 
actually use in their purchasing decisions. They also 
examine the impact of a publicity campaign aimed 
at raising consumer awareness of the new beef-la-
beling rule in Europe. Ordered probit models were 
applied to cross-sectional data collected in Belgium 
for the analysis. The results suggest that different 
types of consumers in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics want different information. How-
ever, through the use of promotion the firms can 
change what consumers value when making pur-
chasing decisions. Moreover, while traceability and 
country of origin have legal importance, marketers 
must be careful not to overload consumers with 
information. 
The Benefits and Costs of Labels
Besides the obvious benefits and costs, externalities 
involved in food production and processing may 
affect the net returns to labeling. For example, free 
riders may be an issue when the information on 
the label has a “public good” aspect pertaining to a 
whole product type and not just to the product that 
uses the label. In this case while many firms share 
the benefits, the costs are borne by a single firm 
(Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 2000). Also, the pro-
duction, processing, and consumption of products 
may entail externalities resulting in social-welfare 
benefits and costs. These positive and negative ex-
ternalities must be accounted for when measuring 
the net social-welfare effects of labeling. 
 For many years food labels were largely un-
regulated, truth-in-labeling. More recently, food 
labels have increasingly become a focal point for 
regulatory action, with a growing list of manda-
tory labeling requirements (Preston 2002). The 
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been to ensure fair competition among producers, 
to increase consumers’ access to information, and 
to reduce risks to individual consumer health and 
safety (Hadden 1986). Whether or not food labels 
have accomplished the intended objectives is 
questionable. Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2000) 
found that mandatory food-labeling requirements 
are best suited to alleviate asymmetric- or imper-
fect-information problems and are rarely effective 
in redressing environmental or other spillovers as-
sociated with food production and consumption. 
Asymmetric or missing information exists when the 
market does not supply enough information to allow 
consumers to make consumption choices mirroring 
their individual preferences (Golan, Kuchler, and 
Mitchell 2000). This occurs mainly in markets for 
foods with negative credence attributes. Mandatory 
labeling may also be used to impact consumption 
decisions to bring them more in line with what is 
deemed best for society. For example, with nutri-
tion labeling and information on fat and cholesterol, 
consumers will hopefully reduce the amount of un-
healthy food that they consume. This would lead 
to a healthier society, lower health-care costs, and 
higher productivity. 
Crespi and Marette (2003) examine the use of 
public labeling with the goal of mitigating potential 
inefficiencies resulting from imperfect information 
about product characteristics. They distinguish be-
tween experience characteristics, where quality is 
revealed after purchasing, and credence character-
istics, where quality is not revealed after purchas-
ing--e.g., food safety, production process, GMOs, 
or ethical characteristics of products. They discuss 
the use of labeling to signal to the consumer the 
true characteristics of the products. With credence 
characteristics the absence of consumer detection 
makes labeling very important, since it is intended 
to transmit a credible signal to the consumer about 
the true characteristic of the product. However, with 
experience characteristics, the private sector under 
competition is likely to be more efficient than is 
mandatory regulation. 
Process-based Labeling 
Process-based labeling has attracted a lot of at-
tention in recent years in light of controversies on 
genetically modified foods, concerns over animal 
cruelty, the use of chemicals in food production and 
processing, and the outbreaks of mad cow disease 
and other serious food-based illnesses. The objec-
tive of process-based labels is not only to inform 
consumers but also to shape the production process. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of process-based 
labels will be reduced once consumers realize the 
degree of subjectivity and unverifiability of process-
based labels (McHughen 2003). Credence charac-
teristics such as food safety, production conditions, 
GMOs, or ethical characteristics are unobservable 
qualities and are hard to measure. In the case of 
credence characteristics, the food industry alone 
cannot ascertain credibility—consumers may trust 
public agencies and consumer-action groups more 
than they do the food industry itself. Crespi and 
Marette (2003) point to research that shows U.S. 
consumers trust the safety claims of public agencies 
(in the case of food irradiation), while the majority 
of French consumers trust independent consumer-
action groups more than they do the French public 
agency for food quality. 
 Roosen (2003) examines heightened European 
consumer concerns as a result of the successive 
food-safety crises and the measures taken in Europe 
in response to these concerns. These include label-
ing, traceability, and country-of-origin documenta-
tion. The use of private labels in Europe to signal 
quality and credence attributes is also examined. 
Her recent survey of European retailers shows that 
food safety and customer loyalty are the most im-
portant factors influencing their private-label policy. 
Statistical results from her study show that while 
concerns about biological food-safety hazards do 
not influence the level of importance consumers 
place on brands, these concerns do impact the level 
of importance consumers place on the country of 
origin. 
McCluskey and Loureiro (2003) discuss re-
search that shows that consumer response to GM 
food labeling depends on their country or culture. 
For example, Chinese consumers, who seem to 
place a higher value on technology, may respond 
to process-based labels entirely differently than do 
European and Japanese consumers, who may prefer 
foods that use traditional ingredients. 
  Although consumer demand has been the im-
petus for process-based labeling, McHughen (2003) 
points out the fundamental problems that arise both 
conceptually and practically in implementation of 
process-based labels. The main focus of McHugh-
en’s paper is GM foods. His study differentiates pro-
cessed-based systems from product-based systems. 66   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Henneberry and Armbruster Emerging Roles for Food Labels   67
The main problems with labeling GM foods are the 
subjectivity of the definition and the verification 
of the impact of GM foods to human health and to 
environmental safety. Despite the advances in our 
knowledge about GM foods, there is still very little 
information about the technologies in use or about 
the regulatory processes established to protect us 
from potentially dangerous products (McHughen 
2003). 
The important economic concern about process-
based labels is who would pay the cost of labeling. 
This cost is not necessarily paid by those demanding 
it and it may provide no additional health, safety or 
nutritional information to consumers. McHughen 
(2003) states that those demanding labels on GM 
foods are more likely to not purchase the foods 
because they fear such foods as potentially unsafe. 
He therefore concludes that the costs of mandatory 
process-based labels is borne mainly by consumers 
of non-GM foods and by the poor, people who don’t 
care about labels anyway because they can’t afford 
to discriminate. Furthermore, mandatory process-
based labeling would involve a huge bureaucratic 
effort at a massive cost to society for the regulatory 
system that would be required to monitor and label 
every process undergone by every ingredient. 
Crespi and Marette (2003) present research on 
the best way to finance public-inspection programs. 
For food-safety verification, a variety of user-fi-
nancing schemes are used by food-safety agencies 
around the world. Crespi and Marette state that 
raising revenues for labeling imposes distortion-
ary costs on the economy. 
The U.S. dolphin-safe tuna program is another 
example of process-based labeling. Reacting to 
the high levels of dolphin mortality in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific Ocean, Congress amended the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and in 
1990 created a highly popular consumer labeling 
program for “dolphin-safe tuna.” This program out-
lawed the labeling of tuna caught by intentionally 
netting dolphins as “dolphin-safe.” Other amend-
ments required all nations exporting tuna to the U.S. 
to adopt dolphin protection programs “comparable” 
to that of the U.S. Despite broad public support in 
the U.S. Europe and an increasing number of coun-
tries in Asia, the U.S. dolphin-safe tuna program 
has become under attack by Mexico, Venezuela and 
several other Latin American countries as a trade 
barrier. The GATT upheld the labeling provision 
because it did not prohibit the movement of goods, 
and was applied equally to foreign and domestic 
products (Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 2000). 
Snape (2003) reports that although countries such 
as Mexico have gained market access in the U.S. 
as a result of the 1997 International Dolphin Con-
servation Program Act (IDCPA), the US “dolphin-
safe” tuna standard has not changed to Mexico’s 
liking because scientists continue to conclude that 
the practice of intentionally encircling dolphins is 
having a “significant adverse impact” on depleted 
dolphin populations. Mexico argues that it does not 
possess the market access that it desires, and has 
consequently threatened to take the U.S. before the 
WTO and to sue the U.S. tuna industry for damages. 
Snape’s discussion focuses on the U.S. litigation 
that has ensued under the MMPA, and the legal 
prospects for another trade/environment battle at 
the WTO. 
Country-of-Origin-Labeling 
The US 2002 Farm Act amends the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1946 to require retailers to in-
form consumers of the country of origin for covered 
commodities. A voluntary program is in effect until 
September 30, 2004, when the program becomes 
mandatory. The term “covered commodity” is de-
fined as muscle cuts of beef, lamb, and pork; ground 
beef, ground lamb, and ground pork; farm-raised 
fish and shellfish; wild fish and shellfish; perishable 
agricultural commodities; and peanuts. Perishable 
agricultural commodities are defined as fresh fruits 
and vegetables. One important question to be an-
swered is whether consumers are willing to pay for 
Country-of-Origin Labeling (COOL).
 Research by Umberger et al. (2003) quantita-
tively and qualitatively evaluates U.S. consumers’ 
preferences for COOL of beef products. Through 
surveys and experimental auctions, consumers’ pref-
erences and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for COOL 
were elicited. Their research results showed that the 
surveyed consumers in Chicago and Denver were 
willing to pay a premium for COOL. The results 
also indicated that those who were willing to pay 
the most for the label believed the label signified 
increased food safety and quality. Umberger et al. 
(2003) state that additional research is needed to 
determine if the premiums are substantial enough to 
cover the additional costs associated with COOL. 
 Nevertheless, industry and producer views on 
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gin-labeling are mixed. Tim Hammonds (2003), the 
President of the Food Marketing Institute, describes 
the food industry’s concerns about COOL. He refers 
to the industry’s struggle to understand the COOL 
implications and the not-so-encouraging answers 
to questions regarding the impacts of COOL on the 
American agricultural and food-industry sectors. 
He explains, “The fact that no major supermarket 
company has joined the voluntary program, despite 
the fact that retailers have a long history of support-
ing consumer information, tells you all you need 
to know about whether this will be a good idea or 
not.” He gives beef as an example and explains 
that as a result of COOL, beef will become more 
expensive relative to poultry, which is not covered 
under COOL and retailers will move increasingly 
to pre-packaged meats at the expense of in-store 
processing. He describes the negative impacts of 
COOL on ranchers who are unable to document the 
history of their animals. These ranchers will find 
themselves unable to sell to supermarkets forcing 
their beef into the export or food-service markets, 
which are not covered under COOL regulations. He 
also identifies the industry’s concern regarding the 
cost of implementation of COOL. 
 Miller’s (2003) presentation gives a differ-
ent angle to views on the impact of COOL, one 
representing the Rancher-Cattlemen Action Legal 
Fund–United Stock growers of America (R-CALF 
USA) which is a non-profit association represent-
ing U.S. cattle producers in the areas of trade and 
marketing. Miller states that R-CALF USA strongly 
supports the mandatory COOL law and believes that 
U.S. consumers and producers will benefit from the 
law: “Producers will be able to focus their ongoing 
promotional investment toward their own products, 
not their competitor’s. It will give consumers the 
power to determine how they want their beef pro-
duced and from where.”
 European experience with geographic-origin 
labeling of products has been successful. Marette 
and Zago (2003) describe the Apellation d’Origin 
Controllee (AOC) wines and the success in mar-
keting of these often blended wines. They explain 
that wine making in the EU is very regulated and 
based on tradition, with a big role assigned to lo-
cal wines sold under names generally associated 
with the production region. They further examine 
the competition that the traditional wine produc-
ers and exporters such as France, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal face from the New World wine markers 
in Australia, California, Chile, and other emerging 
wine-producing countries. The results of their study 
show that it is profitable for producers to join forces 
in advertising to enter new markets. They further 
discuss the possible modifications of the AOC sys-
tem to facilitate collective action and to improve 
investment levels. 
 Bureau and Valceschini (2003) also discuss the 
European Union’s labeling policy on the geographic 
origin of products. The European policy benefits 
specialty products, such as wine from a given 
area, because of the reputation that is well-identi-
fied by consumers. However, bureaucracy, lack of 
international traceability of labels, and competition 
from registered brand names are limitations of the 
EU geographic-origin policy. They discuss that 
uncertainties exist with regard to future impacts of 
the EU policy given the growing globalization of 
markets. 
Summary and Implications
This paper provides an overview of food-labeling 
issues and challenges faced by producers, proces-
sors and regulators in achieving their wide ranging 
objectives. The research results presented at the 
Food Labeling Conference give various views on 
the effectiveness of food labels in increasing market 
sales and improving social welfare. However, many 
questions remain unanswered. This indicates the 
need for future research on understanding private 
and social benefits and costs involved in food-la-
beling policies. Moreover, with recent WTO devel-
opments and economic globalization, research is 
needed on harmonization of food labels across the 
world for more-efficient marketing of agricultural 
and food products. 
 Caution is appropriate for policymakers, pro-
ducers, processors, and various interest groups 
promoting increased mandatory labeling of food. 
Evidence indicates mixed consumer responses to 
process-based labeling. Whether the aggregate costs 
of labeling and their distribution outweigh the so-
cietal benefits that may accrue is an open question. 
How mandatory labeling is framed in policy and 
implemented through regulations will determine 
the costs involved. Sticking with labels that are 
based on well-documented science may be the 
prudent course of action, but research needs to be 
undertaken to evaluate the health and environmental 
bases for providing additional consumer informa-68   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Henneberry and Armbruster Emerging Roles for Food Labels   69
tion through food labeling, as well as the costs and 
who should pay them.
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